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Background
The 2014–2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, primarily 
affecting Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, resulted in an 
estimated 28,639 cases and 11,316 deaths.1 On 30 
September 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) confirmed the first case of Ebola ever 
diagnosed in the United States, which occurred in Dallas in 
a traveler from Liberia (Figure 1).2 This was followed in 
October 2014 by two cases among healthcare workers who 
treated the initial patient in Dallas and a travel-associated 
case in New York City.2,3 These four US cases resulted in 
the rapid escalation of domestic preparedness and response 
activities. In October 2014, CDC issued guidance for 
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Objectives: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention launched the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) 
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Figure 1. Milestones related to global Ebola and Zika responses and the implementation of the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee 
(TEFA) Program, March 2014–October 2017.
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monitoring persons with potential Ebola virus exposure 
daily for 21 days after returning from Ebola-affected coun-
tries and caring for patients with Ebola in the United 
States.4,5 CDC also worked with health departments to des-
ignate hospitals capable of evaluating, diagnosing, and 
treating persons suspected of having Ebola.6 These and 
other Ebola response activities created a short-term need 
for additional epidemiologists (surge capacity) at state and 
local health departments to support emergency prepared-
ness and response programs. In response to this need, CDC 
created the Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee 
(TEFA) program, based in the Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response (now Center for Preparedness 
and Response), Division of State and Local Readiness.
The TEFA program was modeled after CDC’s Career 
Epidemiology Field Officer (CEFO) Program, which assigns 
experienced, highly trained epidemiologists to state, territo-
rial, and local health departments to strengthen public health 
emergency response capacity.7 As funding for the TEFA pro-
gram was temporary, CDC designed it as a 2-year, term-lim-
ited initiative. The administrators of the program and TEFA 
assignees describe the steps taken to launch the program, its 
outcomes, and lessons learned.
Methods
TEFA program funding, hiring, and assignments
In December 2014, the US Congress passed emergency fund-
ing to support the US Ebola response.8 In early 2015, CDC 
awarded money to state and local health departments through a 
grant (the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
Supplemental Funding for Ebola Preparedness and Response 
Activities).9 The grant included funds to create a temporary, 
2-year initiative, the TEFA Program, with an estimated cost of 
US$3.5 million. CDC solicited letters of intent from PHEP 
recipients at state and local health departments interested in 
being host sites, requesting a work plan proposal for a TEFA to 
strengthen local capacity in four key public health prepared-
ness areas outlined in the grant: (1) epidemiology and surveil-
lance (including active monitoring of potential cases of Ebola 
virus disease), (2) health systems preparedness, (3) health com-
munications, and (4) incident management.9 CDC’s criteria for 
selecting recipients for TEFA assignees included a clearly 
expressed need for Ebola preparedness and response activities 
and a well-defined work plan. A total of 14 jurisdictions sub-
mitted proposals meeting this criteria. Because of limited fund-
ing, the agency selected only 11 jurisdictions to host TEFAs, 
one assignee at each site. These included seven states—
Georgia, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee; two cities—Chicago, New York City; one county—
Los Angeles County; and the District of Columbia.
During March–September 2015, CDC recruited TEFA 
candidates and hired them into term-limited federal posi-
tions. Once selected, CDC matched TEFA assignees 
considering results of jurisdictional-level interviews and 
geographical preferences. Eight of the 11 TEFAs were mas-
ters-level graduates of CDC’s Public Health Prevention 
Service (PHPS) Fellowship.10,11 Of the other three, two had 
doctoral-level training (one being a graduate of CDC’s 
Epidemic Intelligence Service)12 and one had masters-level 
training. During October 2015–October 2016, the first year 
of the program, there were a few transitions: TEFAs in Los 
Angeles County and the District of Columbia left for other 
positions, the Pennsylvania TEFA was reassigned, soon after 
starting, to Los Angeles County (and not replaced in 
Pennsylvania), and a new TEFA (a graduate of CDC’s 
Epidemic Intelligence Service) was hired for the District of 
Columbia. All TEFAs had prior experience in local and/or 
state health departments. Many had worked in infectious dis-
eases and/or surveillance, and half had previously deployed 
to the field during the CDC Ebola response.
In October 2015, TEFAs reported to units within state and 
local health departments at their sites. Units included public 
health preparedness and response, hospital preparedness, 
acute disease epidemiology, and outbreak response teams 
(Table 1). Upon arrival, the TEFA and their health depart-
ment supervisors finalized work plans, establishing priority 
activities in the four key preparedness areas for the coming 
year. Within the first few months of the TEFAs’ arrival, 
Ebola virus transmission in West Africa subsided, and Zika 
virus emerged in the Western Hemisphere.13,14 As a result, 
TEFAs made an early transition from Ebola-related response, 
recovery, and preparedness to Zika-related response activi-
ties, while continuing to respond to everyday public health 
events (e.g. foodborne outbreaks and suspect measles cases). 
TEFAs documented their work in quarterly reports submitted 
to their CDC supervisor, presentations at national confer-
ences, and publication in scientific journals.15–17
Data collection
Each TEFA’s quarterly report described their activities in the 
four outcome areas defined in the program grant: epidemiol-
ogy and surveillance, health communications, health sys-
tems preparedness, and incident management systems 
(IMSs). For this article, descriptions of TEFA activities were 
obtained from an analytic process which involved review of 
all TEFA quarterly reports by the authors to identify activi-
ties that fell under each outcome area, an iterative process to 
confirm and clarify activities, and selection of the most 
unique or illustrative examples for each outcome.
Outcomes
Epidemiology and surveillance. TEFAs worked to strengthen 
epidemiology and surveillance by supporting state and local 
efforts in planning for and responding to major (e.g. Ebola and 
Zika) and routine (e.g. Salmonella and Campylobacter) out-
break investigations; these included both event-based 
4 SAGE Open Medicine
and syndromic surveillance (Table 2). Host sites were still 
conducting active monitoring for Ebola when the TEFAs 
arrived. The presence of TEFAs allowed health department 
staff to refocus on their routine operations that had been set 
aside during the Ebola crisis. TEFAs assumed Ebola-related 
duties such as monitoring individuals and their domestic 
travel, managing call center data, assuring data quality, and 
reporting monthly jurisdictional data.
During the Zika response, TEFAs provided leadership in 
epidemiologic and laboratory surveillance. At their host sites, 
they supported the investigation of suspect cases, the creation 
of pregnancy and birth registries, and the design of protocols 
for confirming testing eligibility and submitting diagnostic 
tests to state laboratories. In New York City, a TEFA helped to 
model the Zika Testing Call Center after the Ebola Active 
Monitoring Call Center.15 Lessons learned from the Ebola call 
center enabled the expedited acquisition of call center staff 
and implementation of electronic algorithms for decisions 
regarding the testing of suspected Zika cases.
TEFAs developed methods to collect, visualize, and share 
information about monitoring of individuals exposed to 
high-consequence infectious diseases and to provide situa-
tional awareness during public health emergencies. A TEFA-
led collaboration between the Nebraska Department of 
Health and Human Services and the University of Nebraska 
Medical Center developed an automated monitoring system 
for healthcare providers exposed to high-consequence infec-
tious pathogens using the REDCap cloud-based software 
platform.18 This software collects symptom information 
from exposed healthcare providers, sends text message 
reminders to these providers to enter new symptoms, and 
alerts management when providers report symptoms indica-
tive of monitored diseases. Another project in Tennessee 
involved the development of data collection and visualiza-
tion tools using REDCap and iDashboards to monitor indi-
viduals exposed to avian influenza. These tools provided 
near real-time analytics to state and local epidemiology and 
emergency preparedness staff for timely decision-making 
and can be easily adapted for use with other diseases.19
In the District of Columbia, the TEFA led a collaboration 
with nearby jurisdictions, federal agencies, and healthcare 
facilities to implement human and animal surveillance during 
the 2017 Presidential Inauguration to detect event-related dis-
ease outbreaks and injuries. A multi-pronged approach was 
implemented using syndromic surveillance and field-based 
patient tracking to monitor patients visiting medical aid sta-
tions at both inaugural venues and emergency departments, 
and animals brought to veterinary facilities.
Health communications. TEFAs supported improvements in 
health communications by adapting newer technologies and/
or improving the reliability and reach of existing systems to 
transmit urgent public health incident information to clini-
cians, laboratorians, and public health practitioners. For 
example, two TEFAs were instrumental in improving the 
messaging of jurisdictional health alert networks patterned 
after the national health alert network run by CDC. Health 
alert networks provide a secure communication system for 
rapid distribution of information (e.g. outbreak updates and 
treatment recommendations) via email, phone, fax, pager, 
and text messaging. In Nebraska, the TEFA led the conver-
sion of a fax-based health alert system to an email and text 
message-based system. All 98 hospitals in the state were con-
tacted, and a focal person at each was identified who was 
asked to automate the forwarding of health alert network 
emails and keep the listing current for their facility—result-
ing in a timelier, decentralized, and less resource-intensive 
system. In Los Angeles County, the TEFA and project staff 
conducted a comprehensive evaluation of health alert net-
work benefits and challenges. This effort explored methods 
of increasing participation (e.g. various modes of delivery 
and automatic enrollment at the time of licensure renewal) 
and led to recommendations for improving health alert net-
work messaging both in format and content.
Table 1. Organizational units within state and local health departments where each Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) 
was placed and duration of TEFA assignment.
Jurisdiction of 
assignment
Organizational unit No. months TEFA 
assigned
Chicago Hospital Preparedness Program 17
District of Columbia Center for Policy, Planning and Evaluation & Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Administration
24
Georgia Acute Disease Epidemiology Section (ADES) 24
Los Angeles County Acute Communicable Disease Control 22
Maryland Office of Preparedness and Response, Planning Team 24
Nebraska Division of Public Health Epidemiology and Informatics Unit 23
New Jersey Division of Epidemiology, Environmental and Occupational Health/Communicable 
Disease Services/Infectious and Zoonotic Diseases Program
15
New York City Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, Bureau of Healthcare System 
Readiness
24
Ohio Outbreak Response and Bioterrorism Investigation Team (ORBIT) 18
Tennessee Communicable and Environmental Diseases and Emergency Preparedness Division 21
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In Georgia, the TEFA led the design and implementation of 
the Travel Clinical Assistant (TCA), a free web-based tool that 
allows clinicians to search for current infectious disease out-
breaks in 231 countries.20,21 The tool lists incubation periods, 
clinical symptoms, transmission modes, and infection control 
recommendations. The TCA uses multiple data sources includ-
ing CDC travel health notices and is continually updated. The 
TCA has been promoted statewide at professional conferences 
and meetings and was added as a web tool to the intranet sites 
of two major hospital systems in Georgia.
Health systems preparedness. TEFAs helped strengthen health 
systems preparedness for high-consequence pathogens by 
enhancing healthcare coalitions (e.g. recruiting new partners 
Table 2. Examples of Temporary Epidemiology Field Assignee (TEFA) program major activities to strengthen preparedness and 
response capabilities of state and local jurisdictions, October 2015–October 2017.
Outcomes Jurisdiction Example TEFA activitiesa
Epidemiology and surveillance
Monitoring of persons 
exposed to Ebola
MD, NJ, NYC, 
OH, TN
Coordinated personnel for Ebola Call Center (NYC)
Led active monitoring of returning travelers (MD, NJ, NYC, OH, TN)
Zika surveillance and 
epidemiology
CHI, MD, NYC, 
NE, NJ, TN
Developed laboratory testing criteria and coordinated approval of test requests (CHI, 
NYC, NJ, TN)
Investigated Zika cases, ensured data quality, and reported results (MD, NJ, TN)
Established pregnancy and birth registries for persons potentially exposed to Zika 
(NE, NJ)
Data visualization LAC, TN Created dashboards to inform response planning for avian influenza outbreak (TN)
Supported data maintenance for Zika dashboard updates (LAC)
Outbreak investigations CHI, LAC, NE, 
TN
Investigated Campylobacter outbreak linked to contaminated water in a small rural 
municipality (NE)
Investigated invasive group A strep outbreak (CHI)
Investigated Salmonella outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit (LAC)
Syndromic surveillance DC, MD Coordinated syndromic surveillance and patient tracking during Presidential 
Inauguration (DC, MD)
Integrated non-fatal overdose, emergency department visit data into opioid response 
(MD)
Health communications
Jurisdictional health alert 
network
LAC, NE, NJ Evaluated the effectiveness of the county health alert network system and developed 
recommendations (LAC)
Facilitated health alert network system switch from fax to email-based system (NE)
Wrote health network alerts for vectorborne diseases and established testing/
reporting guidelines (NJ)
Public and provider 
education
CHI, GA, NJ, 
TN
Developed pamphlets about well-water safety after wildfires (TN)
Developed a community-wide Zika campaign, targeting high-risk neighborhoods (CHI)
Developed web-based country search tool (Travel Clinical Assistant) to disseminate 
outbreak information and infection control precautions to providers (GA)
Health systems preparedness
Response plan 
development
CHI, MD, GA, 
NE, NJ, NYC
Contributed to the development of jurisdictional Ebola Response Plan (CHI, GA, MD, 
NYC, NJ)
Developed State Heroin and Opioid Overdose Alert and Response Plan (MD)
Assisted in revising State’s Zika, Dengue and Chikungunya Response Plan (NE)
Drills and exercises CHI, NJ, NYC Facilitated tabletop exercise for Ebola patient transport to Regional Treatment 
Center (CHI, NJ, NYC)
Organized personal protective equipment training and Ebola transport drills for 
frontline hospitals and EMS providers (CHI)
Incident management
Support Zika national 
response
CHI, LAC, MD, 
NYC, OH, TN
Deployed to American Samoa and US Virgin Islands (developing pregnancy registries), 
Puerto Rico (promoting health risk communications at ports of entry), and supporting 
CDC Emergency Operations Center in Atlanta
MD: Maryland; NJ: New Jersey; NYC: New York City; OH: Ohio; TN: Tennessee; CHI: Chicago; NE: Nebraska; LAC: Los Angeles County; DC: District 
of Columbia; GA: Georgia.
aExamples are not exhaustive, so some jurisdictions in subcategories may not be represented.
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and conducting training on emergency plans) and collaborating 
in the development of response plans for all-hazards scenarios, 
including natural disasters and emergencies involving bioter-
rorism, chemical, nuclear, and/or radiological events. Response 
plans outline the responsibilities of federal, state, and local 
partners in events that require active monitoring, laboratory 
diagnosis, follow-up of contacts, patient isolation, transporta-
tion of persons under investigation, and/or collaboration with 
multiple stakeholders. TEFAs also coordinated with partner 
organizations to develop training programs (e.g. infection con-
trol) and led or participated in state and local emergency 
response exercises, which were essential for strengthening the 
plans, getting partner buy-in, and preparing emergency 
response staff. In Chicago, the TEFA chaired an advisory group 
which developed the health department planning document 
which provided strategic and operational guidance for the City 
of Chicago and its public, private, and nonprofit healthcare sys-
tem partners to prepare for and respond to an Ebola incident.
IMSs. TEFAs filled IMS leadership roles in their jurisdictions’ 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), coordinating public 
health response efforts to disease outbreaks, natural disasters, 
and the opioid epidemic. The TEFA in Tennessee served as 
Operations Section Chief for a measles outbreak in Shelby 
County, coordinating teams responsible for case and contact 
identification and management, data collection and analysis, 
laboratory services, and public education. In Maryland, the 
governor declared a state of emergency in March 2017 to 
address the opioid crisis, implementing a formal IMS struc-
ture, known as the Opioid Operational Command Center 
(OOCC). The Maryland TEFA served terms as interim Deputy 
Incident Commander (March–April 2017) and Planning Sec-
tion Chief (May 2017–September 2017). The TEFA supported 
a small senior advisory group in developing the overarching 
structure of the OOCC using the National IMS and corre-
sponding mission, core functions, operational tempo, and 
reporting mechanisms. Her primary responsibilities as Chief 
Planner were providing policy guidance to decision-makers, 
coordination of statewide opioid-related efforts across state 
and local agencies, development of plans and protocols, in 
addition to data analysis and dissemination. Six TEFAs 
deployed outside their assigned jurisdictions for 30–60 days to 
support CDC’s Zika response activities: one to the CDC EOC 
in Atlanta and five to CDC field teams in American Samoa, 
Puerto Rico, and US Virgin Islands.
Lessons learned
TEFAs’ previous federal and state experience and combined 
epidemiology and management skills enabled them to build 
bridges between local epidemiology and emergency prepared-
ness units, and data collectors and decision-makers. Not only 
did the TEFAs build bridges within their host sites, they also 
served as a valuable link between CDC and local and state 
jurisdictions. For example, as the Zika outbreak progressed, 
laboratory testing guidance and recommendations from CDC 
changed rapidly. TEFAs were able to assist their host and 
deployment sites in interpreting and implementing the guid-
ance and also in providing specific feedback to CDC regard-
ing challenges in operationalizing recommendations. The 
working relationship between emergency preparedness and 
epidemiology units varied by jurisdiction, especially where 
these units existed in different departments or agencies. TEFAs 
played key liaison roles and strengthened collaborations. Their 
web-based data visualization and information technology ini-
tiatives improved decision-making by making surveillance 
data readily available in a usable format to response leaders. 
TEFAs increased local surge capacity during the Ebola and 
Zika outbreaks by assuming response and recovery duties, 
mitigating these high-consequence events and allowing health 
department staff to transition to routine activities.
TEFAs enhanced state-to-state dissemination of best prac-
tices by informally sharing with each other commonly experi-
enced gaps and strategies in their health departments’ plans for 
infectious disease response and monitoring of exposed health-
care providers. They supported post-response after-action 
reporting to identify strengths and weaknesses (e.g. need for 
strengthening risk communication, personal protective equip-
ment protocols, and quarantine/isolation procedures), several 
of which were noted as national gaps in the government report 
“June 2016 US Department of Health and Human Services 
Ebola Response Improvement Plan: Based on Lessons 
Learned from the 2014-2016 Ebola Epidemic.”22 TEFAs were 
able to leverage their deployment experience and their access 
to CDC resources to serve in their various roles.
There were limitations for the TEFA program; in particular, 
the timely identification and hiring of a cadre of highly skilled 
staff for temporary positions. Eight months passed from pro-
gram inception to launch. Most TEFAs were graduates of the 
PHPS, a fellowship that has been discontinued at CDC. This 
3-year fellowship provided skillsets ideally suited to the TEFA 
work—it trained masters-level professionals in both epidemi-
ology and management through two 6-month rotations at 
CDC headquarters and a 24-month assignment in a state or 
local jurisdiction. These individuals were early in their career, 
flexible and willing to accept a temporary position and, in 
many cases, to relocate. The absence of the PHPS will make 
future TEFA-like efforts more challenging, though current 
CDC training programs such as the Public Health Associate 
Program, Preparedness Field Assignee Program, Preventive 
Medicine Residency, and EIS could provide exceptional can-
didates for future TEFA-like initiatives. CDC could also 
explore placing mid-level permanent staff in the field for 
12-month rotations or creating a sustainable mobile field 
assignee program, whose size and term-limits could fluctuate 
in the event of a high-profile emergency. Contracting mecha-
nisms could expedite outside agency hires. The ability to 
quickly identify and hire qualified staff and create the right 
incentives for them to commit to temporary assignments will 
promote the success of similar programs in the future.
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The science of public health preparedness is relatively new; 
evaluating the long-term impact or cost-effectiveness of a pro-
gram, where the endpoint is a mitigated or prevented event, is 
challenging.23 In the absence of an independent, formal evalua-
tion, we believe it is important to document the history and les-
sons learned from this time-limited program to respond to the 
unprecedented outbreak of Ebola in West Africa (2014–2016) 
and Zika emergence in the Western Hemisphere (2016). Many 
state and local public health departments have limited surge 
capacity due to chronic staff shortages caused by an aging (retir-
ing) workforce, budgetary constraints, and administrative barri-
ers to filling positions.24 We believe the TEFA model can be a 
significant component of a national strategy for surging state 
and local capacity in future high-consequence events.
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